

with reference to the notice of Mr. Forsyth, one observation.

The noble lord said he believed Mr. McLeod was not one of the party by whom the Caroline was attacked. His information goes precisely to the same conclusion. With regard to the ground taken by Mr. Forsyth, in replying to Mr. Fox, the American government undoubtedly might have considered this transaction either as a transaction to be dealt with between the two governments, by demands for redress by one to be granted or refused by the other, and dealt with accordingly, or it might have been considered, as the British authorities consider proceedings between American citizens on the British side of the border, as matter to be dealt with by the local authorities. But the American government treat this matter as one to be decided between the two governments, and this is the ground on which they are entitled to demand redress from the British government for the acts of its subjects. On a matter of such extreme difficulty it would be improper for me to enter into further remarks or observations.

Lord Stanley.—The noble lord had not answered one question. One question, and one of great importance I asked, was, whether the government had taken any, and if so, what steps for the protection and liberation of McLeod? (Hear, hear.)

Lord Palmerston.—Sir, a case somewhat similar in principle to the present was expected a year and a half, or two years ago, and instructions were sent at that time to Mr. Fox, on which he founded the communication he made to the American authorities. Of course the house will suppose, I trust, that Mr. Fox's government will send—they have, indeed, sent—certain instructions; but till we get the conclusions of the correspondence it is impossible to send final instructions. I trust the house will believe the government will send such further instructions as they may think it to be their duty to do. I assure the house I am not prepared now to state formally what these instructions are. (Hear.)

Mr. Haume must request the house to suspend their judgment on the case till they had before them the whole of the papers on the subject. It appeared by the papers which he had in his possession that in January, 1838, a motion was made in the House of Representatives, calling upon the government to place on the table of the house all the papers respecting the Caroline, and in consequence of that motion, certain papers which had been received from Mr. Stevenson had been laid on the table of the house on the 13th of May, together with a letter from that gentleman. He wished to know what Mr. Stevenson's instructions were upon which he had acted as he had done?

Lord Palmerston.—I rather think that my hon. friend will find in that correspondence that instructions from the American government were given to Mr. Stevenson to abstain from pressing the subject. (Hear.) With regard to the letter of Mr. Fox, I beg leave to say that the principle stands thus: In the case of the American citizens engaged in invading Canada, the American government disclaimed the acts of those citizens, and stated that the British authorities might deal with them as they pleased—(hear, hear, hear)—and that they were persons who were not in any degree entitled to the protection of the United States. But in the other case, they treated the affair of the Caroline as one to be considered as that of the government, and not to be left upon the responsibility of individuals.—Until, therefore, the British government discovers those persons, as the American government discovered their citizens in the other case, they would have no right to change their ground upon the question. (Hear, hear.)

Sir R. Peel wished to ask whether there were not officers of her majesty's army and navy engaged in the affair of the Caroline, and wounded in that service; and further, whether they had received the same pensions as they would have received if they had suffered such wounds in the service to which they regularly belonged?

Lord Russell understood that officers of her majesty's army and navy were employed on that occasion, under the orders of the colonial authorities, and that that gentleman, he did not intend to lay on the table of the house any papers which they had received any pensions.

In a subsequent part of the evening, Mr. O'Connell said the subject just now before the house ought not to be left as it was. The life of Mr. McLeod was at stake—(hear, hear)—and he (Mr. O'Connell) was sorry that his hon. friend (Mr. Haume) had interposed—(hear)—for he thought there ought to be expressed in that house that Mr. McLeod should be saved, as he acted under the command of the officers of her majesty's government—in fact under the command of her majesty. (Great cheering.) Whether Mr. McLeod was right or wrong, the house ought to declare that it was quite ready to assist the governor in preserving him. (Cheers from both sides.)

On Tuesday, the 9th, Lord Stanley reiterated his motion, and asked whether the Secretary of Foreign Affairs would not reconsider his answer. He did not ask what steps had been taken in reference to McLeod, but he did ask whether they would be effective in point of time.

Lord Palmerston said, that when he stated yesterday that he would have no objection—that he could have no reasonable objection—to offer, against the production of papers which had already been laid before Congress, he did not intend to say any intention on the part of the government to lay on the table of the house any other part of the correspondence, and thought, therefore, the noble lord had and would exercise a sound discretion in abstaining from pressing for it.

Lord Stanley.—I did not ask for it. I asked for the whole correspondence.

Lord Palmerston.—With respect to the other question what he had to state was this. A case of a somewhat similar nature happened, or was about to happen, a year or a year and a half ago upon that occasion instructions were sent out to Mr. Fox, laying down what the government thought were sound principles in the emergency. At that time it was rendered unnecessary to act upon the instructions; but the case having now actually occurred, Mr. Fox, without waiting for further instructions from home, acted upon the former instructions and made the demand upon the American government for the liberation of McLeod.

He then reported the whole case to the government, but from various causes that communication had been much longer given in its passage than usual, and it was only a few days ago that he received the final portion of what had taken place between Mr. Fox and the American government; it was, therefore, only that day that an opportunity had presented itself for sending out final and conclusive instructions—they were then sent off; but what the nature of those instructions was, neither the noble lord nor the house would expect him to say. Mr. Fox had founded his remonstrance with the American government upon instructions sent him by the government respecting a case of a similar nature, which it was feared would have occurred.

Lord Stanley wished to understand whether the noble lord received information of the intervention of Mr. Fox, relative to the affair to Nov. 12, 15, 16, and whether any instructions had been sent to that gentleman upon the subject.

Lord Palmerston said that the instructions given were precisely to the same effect as those which were stated as having been given in the former case. It was not till Saturday last that the government had received from Mr. Fox the last communication respecting his correspondence with United States authorities.

government approved of the orders of the colonial government under which the Caroline was attacked. (Cheers.) His noble friend had already answered his question. (Cheers.)

Mr. V. Duncanson wished to ask the secretary for foreign affairs, whether the government had adopted the act of the captors of the Caroline as their own? He thought it right that the house should know whether they had given their approbation or not, and whether, if they had given it, they had since withdrawn it—(hear, hear)—or did they now adopt it? (Hear, hear.)

Lord Palmerston said that, if the question were whether the government did or not consider the captors of the Caroline justified, his answer was, that the government did consider them perfectly justified.

Mr. Haume.—Has the noble lord, or her majesty's government ever signified that to the government of the United States in any form? (Hear.)

Lord Palmerston.—Yes; it has been communicated both to the minister of the United States here, and by Mr. Fox to the American government.

The conversation here dropped.

FRANCE.

The last intelligence acquaints us that the fortification law has been carried in the Chamber of Deputies by a majority of 75, and that by the defeat of sundry amendments calculated to embarrass the execution of it. The *excuse* is to be completed, and the detached forts are to be raised simultaneously with it. But Marshal Soult reserves to the government the right of determining how the works are to be constructed, and where the forts are to be placed.

The Courier Francaise, states that on Monday evening, immediately after the adoption of the fortification bill by the Chamber of Deputies, the ambassadors of Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia, despatched extraordinary couriers to their respective governments.

The foundations.—The perfects of the different departments visited by the late inundations of the Rhone and Saone, have sent in to the government official returns of the damages sustained by the different districts placed within their respective jurisdictions.

It appears that 58 counties were ravaged by the scourge; and the losses suffered in house and landed property, amounted to 9,495,326fr.; and in goods, seeds, corn, and furniture, to 6,396,165fr.—in all 15,891,491fr., divided among 7,972 sufferers.

AUSTRIA.

The Serbian Mercury, under date the 28th ult., states that the Austrian army was on its full war footing. At a moment's notice, the Austrian government could bring into the field 300,000 men and 600 pieces of cannon.

RUSSIA.

From Odessa, a correspondent writes, on the 10th ult., to the Constitutionnel:—

"The Crimea is ravaged by a typhus fever which carries off great numbers of the land and sea forces. Admiral Lazareff has been obliged to send nearly all the sailors to Nicolaief, leaving only a few at Sebastopol. A letter from Tiflis states that Gen. Rakowsky, chief of the staff of the army of the Caucasus, has been sent to the Shah of Persia to settle the amount of the troops which Russia is to furnish for putting a stop to the brigandage of the Kurds. It is expected that these Russian corps will begin their march for Persia in April. Rear-Admiral Kuzin will, it is said, have the command of the fleet in the Caspian Sea." The Emperor of Russia has conferred the Order of St. Andrew on the Archduke Albert of Austria.

EGYPT.

An express from Alexandria, by the Oriental steam, brings the intelligence that the Turkish fleet had all left the harbor, and set sail for Marsa Matruh, under the orders of Admiral Walker.

CHINA.

London, Feb. 9.—By an extraordinary express, we have dates from Canton to Nov. 3; from Calcutta to Nov. 2; from Hong Kong to Nov. 2; from Amoy, Jan. 28; and from Malacca, Jan. 28.—The latest intelligence from the island of Chusan, is dated Oct. 24, and from Macao, Nov. 3. By these it appears that the posture of affairs in China remains unchanged since our last advices, and the most gloomy apprehensions as to the final result of the proposed negotiations were entertained. Both in China and India the conduct of the Admiral is commented upon in most severe terms, and it seems to be the universal opinion that in consenting to withdraw his forces from the immediate neighborhood of Peking, he has committed a gross error, and allowed himself to be duped by the Chinese commissioners.

The negotiations would probably be protracted indefinitely by every artifice common in Chinese diplomacy, and a fresh expedition, after all, would be required to effect the original objects of the present. The Admiral was still at Chusan, which had been found extremely unhealthy.

INDIA.

The intelligence from India, is generally pacific, and no event had occurred since the last dates of much political importance. Afghanistan remained tranquil.

An action had occurred in Scinde, on the 1st December, at Kotriah, between 4,000 Beluchos posted among the hills, and commanded by Nusseer Khan, 600 irregular horse, and two field pieces, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall. The Beluchos attacked the position, and a desperate defence was made by the Beluchos till four of their chiefs and 500 men were slain. Six other chiefs and 132 followers were taken prisoners. Nusseer Khan escaped on foot, but all the baggage, &c. were captured by the British, who only lost one officer and 10 privates; 30 more were wounded.

ARABIA.

The accounts from Aden of the 10th of January state every thing to be quiet there, and that the place was rapidly increasing in population and generally improving. The Regenerator of the Faith, as the bigoted old man was pleased to term himself, had been totally defeated by the Imam of Senna, taken prisoner, and beheaded which has of course quieted rebellion to a considerable extent. The Imam before another month, will attack the support towns of Mocha, Haddah, and Zebid. He is favorably disposed to the English.

Resignation of Mr. Bancroft.—George Bancroft, Esq. Collector of the port of Boston and Charleston, sent on to Washington, to-day, his resignation of that office, to take effect from this time. It is no more than an act of justice to Mr. Bancroft, to say that he has performed the duties of his office with promptness and fidelity, and to the entire satisfaction of the Executive Department and those who have done business at the Custom House during his administration. He will carry with him into retirement, the respect and well wishes of a large portion of our citizens, of both parties; and those political opponents who have aimed their calumnious shafts at his political course, will still find him, we trust, exerting his pre-eminent powers in favor of those great principles of political equality which he has so able and eloquently explained and defended. We predict that he will not remain long in retirement.—Bay State Democrat.

Extra Session.—The Richmond Whig of Wednesday says:—We understand that Gen. Harrison makes no secret of his determination to call an extra session of Congress, probably in May, and that the necessity for doing so has urged itself upon his mind for several months past.

Prices of Produce.—The promise of high prices made by the Federalists to the farmers of Ohio, appear not to be realized. The Scioto (O.) Watchman informs us of the state of the market. Flour \$3.60, Wheat 50 cts., Rye 25 cts., Corn 1-2, Oats 1-2, Butter 4 cts., Eggs 1-2, Potatoes 1-2, Cuckwheat 81.75. This is a low and better times with a vengeance.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS OF PRESIDENT HARRISON.

MARCH 4, 1841.

Called from a retirement which I had supposed to be to continue for the residue of my life, to fill the Chief Executive office of this great and free nation, I appear before you, fellow citizens, to take the oaths which the Constitution prescribes, as a necessary qualification for the performance of its duties. And in obedience to a custom coeval with our government, and to what I believe to be your expectations, I proceed to present to you a summary of the principles which will govern me, in the discharge of the duties which I shall be called upon to perform.

It was the remark of a Roman Consul, in an early period of that celebrated Republic, that a most striking contrast was observable in the conduct of candidates for offices of power and trust, before and after obtaining them—they seldom carrying out in the latter case the pledges and promises made in the former. However much the world may have improved in many respects, in the lapse of upwards of two thousand years since the remark was made by the virtuous Cato, the error of the age is not so different as the age of the world, in its judgment, are attributable to a disconnection of some of its provisions. Of the former, the eligibility of the same individual to a second term of the presidency. The sagacious mind of Mr. Jefferson, early saw and lamented this error, and attempts have been made hitherto without success, to apply the amenerary power of the States to its correction.

As, however, one mode of correction is in the power of every President, and consequently in mine, it would be useless, and perhaps insidious, to enumerate the evils of which, in the opinion of many of our fellow-citizens, this error of the age who framed the Constitution may have seen the source, and the bitter fruits which we are still to gather from it, if it continues to disfigure our system. It may be observed, however, as a general remark, that Republics can commit no greater error than to adopt or continue any feature in their systems of government which may be calculated to create or increase the love of power, in the bosoms of those to whom necessity obliges them to commit the management of their affairs. And, surely, nothing is more likely to produce such a state of mind, than the long continuance of an office of high trust. Nothing can more corruptly influence the conduct of all those noble feelings which belong to the character of a devoted patriotic patriot.—When the corrupting passion once takes possession of the human mind, like the love of gold, it becomes insatiable. It is the never-dying worm in his bosom, grows with his growth, and strengthens with the declining years of his victim. If this is true, it is the part of wisdom for a republic to limit the service of that officer, at least, to whom she has entrusted the management of her foreign relations, the execution of her laws, and the command of her armies and navies, to a period so short as to prevent the possibility of his becoming avaricious, or the principal of the nation, not the master of it. Until an amendment of the Constitution can be effected, public opinion may secure the desired effect. I give my aid to it, by renewing the pledge heretofore given, that, under no circumstances, will I consent to serve a second term.

But if there is danger to public liberty from the acknowledged defects of the Constitution, in the want of limit to the continuance of the Executive power in the same hands, there is, I apprehend, not much less from a misconception of that instrument, as it regards the powers actually given. I cannot conceive that, by a false construction, any officer of the government would be found to substitute the President a part of the legislative power. It cannot be claimed from the power to recommend, since although enjoined as a duty upon him, it is a privilege which he holds in common with every other citizen. And although there may be something more of confidence in the propriety of the measures recommended in the one case than in the other, in the obligations of ultimate decision on recommendations, the President is not a part of the Constitution "all the legislative powers" which it grants "are vested in the Congress of the United States." It would be a solecism in language to say that any portion of these is not included in the whole.

It may be said, indeed, that the Constitution has given to the Executive the power to annul the acts of the legislative body by refusing to sign them. So a similar power has necessarily resulted from that granted to the Judiciary; and yet the Judiciary forms no part of the Legislature. There is, it is true, this difference between the two branches of power; the Executive can put his negative upon the acts of the Legislature for other cause than that of want of conformity to the Constitution, whilst the Judiciary can only declare void those which violate that instrument. But the decision of the Judiciary is final in such a case, whereas, in every instance where the veto of the Executive is applied, it may be overcome by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress. The negative upon the acts of the Legislature, by the Executive authority, and that in the hands of one individual, would seem to be an incongruity in our system. Like some other of a similar kind, however, it appears to be highly expedient; and if used only with the forbearance, and in the spirit which was intended by its authors, it may be productive of great good, and be found one of the best safeguards to the Union. At the period of the formation of the Constitution, the principle does not appear to have enjoyed much favor in the State Governments. It existed but in two, and in one of these there was a plural Executive. If we would search for the motives which operated upon the purely patriotic and enlightened assembly which framed the Constitution, for the adoption of a provision so apparently incongruous in our democratic principle, that the majority should govern, we must reject the idea that they anticipated from it any benefit to the ordinary course of legislation. They knew too well the high degree of intelligence which existed among the people, and the enlightened character of the State legislatures, not to have the fullest confidence that the two bodies elected by their worthy representatives of such constituents; and, of course that they would require no aid in conceiving and maturing the measures which the circumstance of the country might require. And it is preposterous to suppose that a thought could for a moment have been entertained, that the President, placed at the capital, in the centre of the country, could better understand the wants and wishes of the people than their own immediate representatives, who spend a part of every year among them, living with them, often laboring with them, and bound to them by the triple tie of interest, duty and affection. To assist or control Congress, then, in its ordinary legislation, could not, I conceive, have been the motive for conferring the veto power on the President. This argument acquires additional force from the fact of its never having been thus used by the first Presidents—and two of them were members of the convention for framing the Constitution—and the other two, by a larger share in consummating the labors of the august body than any other person. But if bills were never returned to Congress by either of the Presidents above referred to, upon the ground of their being inexpedient, or not as well adapted as they might be to the wants of the People, the veto was applied upon that of want of conformity to the Constitution or because errors had been committed from a too hasty enactment.

There is another ground for the adoption of the Veto principle, which had probably more influence in recommending it to the convention than any other. Before the security which it gives to the just and equitable action of the Legislature upon all parts of the Union. It could not but have occurred to the convention that, in a country so extensive, embracing so great a variety of soil and climate, and consequently, of products, and which, from the same causes, must ever exhibit a great difference in the amount of the population of its various sections, calling for a great diversity in the employment of the people, that the legislation of the majority might not always justly regard the rights and interests of the minority; and that acts

been granted to the Federal Government, and more particularly of that portion which had been assigned to the Executive branch. There were in it features which appeared not to be in harmony with their ideas of a simple representative Democracy, or Republic. And knowing the tendency of power to increase itself, particularly when exercised by a single individual, predictions were made that, at no very remote period, the Government would terminate in virtual monarchy. It would not become me to say that the fears of these patriots have been already realized. But, as I sincerely believe that the tendency of measures, and of men's opinion, for some years past has been in that direction, it is, I conceive, strictly proper that I should take this occasion to repeat the assurance I have heretofore given of a determination to arrest the progress of that tendency, if it really exists, and to restore the Government to its pristine health and vigor, so far as this can be effected by any legitimate exercise of the power placed in my hands.

I now proceed to state, in as summary a manner as I can, my opinion of the sources of the evils which have been so extensively complained of, and the correctives which may be applied. Some of the defects of the Constitution; others, in my judgment, are attributable to a disconnection of some of its provisions. Of the former, the eligibility of the same individual to a second term of the presidency. The sagacious mind of Mr. Jefferson, early saw and lamented this error, and attempts have been made hitherto without success, to apply the amenerary power of the States to its correction.

As, however, one mode of correction is in the power of every President, and consequently in mine, it would be useless, and perhaps insidious, to enumerate the evils of which, in the opinion of many of our fellow-citizens, this error of the age who framed the Constitution may have seen the source, and the bitter fruits which we are still to gather from it, if it continues to disfigure our system. It may be observed, however, as a general remark, that Republics can commit no greater error than to adopt or continue any feature in their systems of government which may be calculated to create or increase the love of power, in the bosoms of those to whom necessity obliges them to commit the management of their affairs. And, surely, nothing is more likely to produce such a state of mind, than the long continuance of an office of high trust. Nothing can more corruptly influence the conduct of all those noble feelings which belong to the character of a devoted patriotic patriot.—When the corrupting passion once takes possession of the human mind, like the love of gold, it becomes insatiable. It is the never-dying worm in his bosom, grows with his growth, and strengthens with the declining years of his victim. If this is true, it is the part of wisdom for a republic to limit the service of that officer, at least, to whom she has entrusted the management of her foreign relations, the execution of her laws, and the command of her armies and navies, to a period so short as to prevent the possibility of his becoming avaricious, or the principal of the nation, not the master of it. Until an amendment of the Constitution can be effected, public opinion may secure the desired effect. I give my aid to it, by renewing the pledge heretofore given, that, under no circumstances, will I consent to serve a second term.

But if there is danger to public liberty from the acknowledged defects of the Constitution, in the want of limit to the continuance of the Executive power in the same hands, there is, I apprehend, not much less from a misconception of that instrument, as it regards the powers actually given. I cannot conceive that, by a false construction, any officer of the government would be found to substitute the President a part of the legislative power. It cannot be claimed from the power to recommend, since although enjoined as a duty upon him, it is a privilege which he holds in common with every other citizen. And although there may be something more of confidence in the propriety of the measures recommended in the one case than in the other, in the obligations of ultimate decision on recommendations, the President is not a part of the Constitution "all the legislative powers" which it grants "are vested in the Congress of the United States." It would be a solecism in language to say that any portion of these is not included in the whole.

It may be said, indeed, that the Constitution has given to the Executive the power to annul the acts of the legislative body by refusing to sign them. So a similar power has necessarily resulted from that granted to the Judiciary; and yet the Judiciary forms no part of the Legislature. There is, it is true, this difference between the two branches of power; the Executive can put his negative upon the acts of the Legislature for other cause than that of want of conformity to the Constitution, whilst the Judiciary can only declare void those which violate that instrument. But the decision of the Judiciary is final in such a case, whereas, in every instance where the veto of the Executive is applied, it may be overcome by a vote of two-thirds of both Houses of Congress. The negative upon the acts of the Legislature, by the Executive authority, and that in the hands of one individual, would seem to be an incongruity in our system. Like some other of a similar kind, however, it appears to be highly expedient; and if used only with the forbearance, and in the spirit which was intended by its authors, it may be productive of great good, and be found one of the best safeguards to the Union. At the period of the formation of the Constitution, the principle does not appear to have enjoyed much favor in the State Governments. It existed but in two, and in one of these there was a plural Executive. If we would search for the motives which operated upon the purely patriotic and enlightened assembly which framed the Constitution, for the adoption of a provision so apparently incongruous in our democratic principle, that the majority should govern, we must reject the idea that they anticipated from it any benefit to the ordinary course of legislation. They knew too well the high degree of intelligence which existed among the people, and the enlightened character of the State legislatures, not to have the fullest confidence that the two bodies elected by their worthy representatives of such constituents; and, of course that they would require no aid in conceiving and maturing the measures which the circumstance of the country might require. And it is preposterous to suppose that a thought could for a moment have been entertained, that the President, placed at the capital, in the centre of the country, could better understand the wants and wishes of the people than their own immediate representatives, who spend a part of every year among them, living with them, often laboring with them, and bound to them by the triple tie of interest, duty and affection. To assist or control Congress, then, in its ordinary legislation, could not, I conceive, have been the motive for conferring the veto power on the President. This argument acquires additional force from the fact of its never having been thus used by the first Presidents—and two of them were members of the convention for framing the Constitution—and the other two, by a larger share in consummating the labors of the august body than any other person. But if bills were never returned to Congress by either of the Presidents above referred to, upon the ground of their being inexpedient, or not as well adapted as they might be to the wants of the People, the veto was applied upon that of want of conformity to the Constitution or because errors had been committed from a too hasty enactment.

There is another ground for the adoption of the Veto principle, which had probably more influence in recommending it to the convention than any other. Before the security which it gives to the just and equitable action of the Legislature upon all parts of the Union. It could not but have occurred to the convention that, in a country so extensive, embracing so great a variety of soil and climate, and consequently, of products, and which, from the same causes, must ever exhibit a great difference in the amount of the population of its various sections, calling for a great diversity in the employment of the people, that the legislation of the majority might not always justly regard the rights and interests of the minority; and that acts

of this character might be passed under an express grant by the words of the constitution, and therefore not within the competency of the judiciary to declare void. That however enlightened and patriotic they might suppose, from past experience, the members of Congress might be, and however largely partaking in the general, of the liberal feelings of the People, it was impossible to expect that bodies so constituted should not sometimes be controlled by local interests and sectional feelings. It was proper, therefore, to provide some empire from those situations and mode of appointment more independence and freedom from such influences might be expected. Such a one was afforded by the Executive Department, constituted by the Constitution. A person elected to that high office, having his constituents in every section, State, sub-division of the Union, must consider himself bound by the most solemn sanctions, to guard, protect, and defend the rights of all, and of every portion, great or small, from the injustice and oppression of the rest. I consider the veto power, therefore, given by the Constitution to the Executive of the United States, solely as a power, to be used only, to protect the Constitution from violation; 2dly the People from the effects of hasty legislation, where their will has been probably disregarded or not well understood; 3dly, to prevent the effects of combinations violative of the rights of minorities. In reference to the second of these objects, I may observe that I consider it right and privilege of the people to decide disputed points of the Constitution, arising from the general grant of power to Congress to carry into effect the powers expressly given. And I believe, with Mr. Madison, that repeated reiteration under varied circumstances, in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government, accompanied by indications in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, if its exaltation of the operations of each of its Departments, and the powers which they respectively exercise, and the evils which they respectively incur, in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, if its exaltation of the operations of each of its Departments, and the powers which they respectively exercise, and the evils which they respectively incur, in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, if its exaltation of the operations of each of its Departments, and the powers which they respectively exercise, and the evils which they respectively incur, in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, if its exaltation of the operations of each of its Departments, and the powers which they respectively exercise, and the evils which they respectively incur, in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, if its exaltation of the operations of each of its Departments, and the powers which they respectively exercise, and the evils which they respectively incur, in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, if its exaltation of the operations of each of its Departments, and the powers which they respectively exercise, and the evils which they respectively incur, in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, if its exaltation of the operations of each of its Departments, and the powers which they respectively exercise, and the evils which they respectively incur, in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

of this character might be passed under an express grant by the words of the constitution, and therefore not within the competency of the judiciary to declare void. That however enlightened and patriotic they might suppose, from past experience, the members of Congress might be, and however largely partaking in the general, of the liberal feelings of the People, it was impossible to expect that bodies so constituted should not sometimes be controlled by local interests and sectional feelings. It was proper, therefore, to provide some empire from those situations and mode of appointment more independence and freedom from such influences might be expected. Such a one was afforded by the Executive Department, constituted by the Constitution. A person elected to that high office, having his constituents in every section, State, sub-division of the Union, must consider himself bound by the most solemn sanctions, to guard, protect, and defend the rights of all, and of every portion, great or small, from the injustice and oppression of the rest. I consider the veto power, therefore, given by the Constitution to the Executive of the United States, solely as a power, to be used only, to protect the Constitution from violation; 2dly the People from the effects of hasty legislation, where their will has been probably disregarded or not well understood; 3dly, to prevent the effects of combinations violative of the rights of minorities. In reference to the second of these objects, I may observe that I consider it right and privilege of the people to decide disputed points of the Constitution, arising from the general grant of power to Congress to carry into effect the powers expressly given. And I believe, with Mr. Madison, that repeated reiteration under varied circumstances, in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government, accompanied by indications in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, if its exaltation of the operations of each of its Departments, and the powers which they respectively exercise, and the evils which they respectively incur, in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, if its exaltation of the operations of each of its Departments, and the powers which they respectively exercise, and the evils which they respectively incur, in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, if its exaltation of the operations of each of its Departments, and the powers which they respectively exercise, and the evils which they respectively incur, in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, if its exaltation of the operations of each of its Departments, and the powers which they respectively exercise, and the evils which they respectively incur, in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, if its exaltation of the operations of each of its Departments, and the powers which they respectively exercise, and the evils which they respectively incur, in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, if its exaltation of the operations of each of its Departments, and the powers which they respectively exercise, and the evils which they respectively incur, in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, if its exaltation of the operations of each of its Departments, and the powers which they respectively exercise, and the evils which they respectively incur, in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, if its exaltation of the operations of each of its Departments, and the powers which they respectively exercise, and the evils which they respectively incur, in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, if its exaltation of the operations of each of its Departments, and the powers which they respectively exercise, and the evils which they respectively incur, in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

of this character might be passed under an express grant by the words of the constitution, and therefore not within the competency of the judiciary to declare void. That however enlightened and patriotic they might suppose, from past experience, the members of Congress might be, and however largely partaking in the general, of the liberal feelings of the People, it was impossible to expect that bodies so constituted should not sometimes be controlled by local interests and sectional feelings. It was proper, therefore, to provide some empire from those situations and mode of appointment more independence and freedom from such influences might be expected. Such a one was afforded by the Executive Department, constituted by the Constitution. A person elected to that high office, having his constituents in every section, State, sub-division of the Union, must consider himself bound by the most solemn sanctions, to guard, protect, and defend the rights of all, and of every portion, great or small, from the injustice and oppression of the rest. I consider the veto power, therefore, given by the Constitution to the Executive of the United States, solely as a power, to be used only, to protect the Constitution from violation; 2dly the People from the effects of hasty legislation, where their will has been probably disregarded or not well understood; 3dly, to prevent the effects of combinations violative of the rights of minorities. In reference to the second of these objects, I may observe that I consider it right and privilege of the people to decide disputed points of the Constitution, arising from the general grant of power to Congress to carry into effect the powers expressly given. And I believe, with Mr. Madison, that repeated reiteration under varied circumstances, in acts of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the Government, accompanied by indications in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, if its exaltation of the operations of each of its Departments, and the powers which they respectively exercise, and the evils which they respectively incur, in different nodes of the concurrence of the general will of the nation, as affording to the President sufficient authority for his considering such disputed points as settled.

Upwards of half a century has elapsed since the adoption of our present form of government. It would be an object more highly desirable than the gratification of the curiosity of speculative statesmen, if its precise situation could be ascertained, if its ex